Market Power Does Not Equal Coercive Power

Below is an open letter to Bloomberg:

There is a lot to like in Mark Whitehouse’s op-ed from October 21 (US Labor Markets Aren’t Truly Free) .  However, one place he errs is where he writes (emphasis added): “Economists have offered various explanations, including labor-saving technology, weakened unions, and growing competition from lower-wage countries such as China. More recently, though, they’ve identified another: The job market has become less free. The consolidation of American business has left people with fewer places to work, shifting the balance of power to employers.

The consolidation of American businesses does not necessarily mean the job market is less free.  So long as workers are free to move jobs or relocate, then the job market remains free regardless of its concentration.  So long as transactions are coluntarily entered into and there is no outside interference, the exact structure of a market does not matter when determining freedom.

It is not from the concentration of the market that the lack of freedom arises, but rather the other factors Mr Whitehouse identifies: property zoning, non-poaching agreements, etc.  The industry concentration may be a symptom of these lack of freedoms, but they are not the cause thereof.

Be Skeptical of Regulations Because Knowing the Market is Difficult (Even for Experts)

Given how much money business consultants make, one would think they have pretty good insight into a given industry or market.  And sure, they may have lots of information unavailable to most people, but does that necessarily imply they are better?

All data received, we must remember, is context-dependent.  Data never, ever, speak for themselves.  Interpreting and developing models for given market structures is extremely difficult in this regard because it requires certain assumptions.

Consider the following real-world example: when the guys from Xerox (the copy machine company) wanted to start selling their machines to businesses, they met stiff resistance from consultants and financial backers.  “Why would anyone spend thousands of dollars on a copy machine when we have a perfectly good, cheap substitute: carbon paper?  Copy machines will never sell.”  Prima facie, this criticism seemed legitimate.  Firms and experts observed secretaries and typists using carbon paper to make copies for distribution.  There didn’t seem to be any demand for copy machines.

Undeterred, the Xerox guys pressed on.  They decided to give companies the hardware, toner, and paper for free up until the first 2500 copies per month.  Firms jumped at the idea.  After all, how were they ever going to use 2500 copies a month?

Well, the rest is history.  Xerox is still around.  Carbon paper is not.

Why?  What did the experts get wrong?

They got wrong the scope of the market.  Copy machines weren’t for people writing letters.  They were for people receiving and distributing letters!  The market for copy machines was for the owner who got a letter from his lawyer who wanted to distribute it to the rest of the team.  It was for the product manager who needed to itemize his costs for different departments.  Etc etc.

There is an implicit conceit in economics that we know the market, the shapes of demand and supply curves.  But the reality is, we never do.  We have only data points in a certain context which may or may not provide useful information about other contexts.  This implicit conceit becomes vitally important when we start talking about regulation or “optimal taxes,” which require knowledge of the scope and shape of the market.  Knowledge we simply do not have.

Today’s Quote of the Day…

…is from page 14 of the 3rd edition of Bruno Leoni’s 1961 book Freedom and the Law:

Subsituting legislation for the spontaneous application of nonlegislated rules of behavior is indefensible unless it is proved that the latter are uncertain or insufficient or that they generate some evil that legislation could avoid while maintaining the advantages of the previous system.  This preliminary assesment is unthought of by contemporary legislators.  On the contrary, they seem to think that legislation is always good in itself and that the burden of the proof is upon the people who do not agree.  My humble suggestion is that their implication that a law (even a bad law) is better than nothing should be much more suppored by evidence than it is.

JMM: Note that Leoni’s comment is not the same as doing a cost-benefit analysis, a requirement of current legislation in the United States.  It’s an even higher bar to clear than that: legislation is, essentially, the only way to accomplish something, not that it is merely a way to accomplish something.

The application of legislation, because it requires coercion and, therefore, forces all members of the group to abide by it, should be used as sparingly as possible.  Negative thou shalt not legislation (eg, thou shalt not murder) is preferable to positive thou shall legislation (eg, thou shall give preference in manufacturing to Americans or pay a fine).  Negative legislation has the advantage of being less oppressive; so long as you do not break the rule, you are free to do as you wish.  Additionally, it has the advantage of being general.  For example, the rules of justice are negative: thou shalt not harm another person.  These rules are followed in a million different ways: staying in bed, reading a book, holding a door open, being a recluse, driving defensively (and aggressively), etc.  They do not constrain behavior to a significant degree.

The bar for legislation should be set high, indeed very high, given its potential for abuse.  Negative legislation, as opposed to positive, should be preferred.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy Part 2: On the Presumption of Liberty

As with any model in any science, we need to ask the questions: “how well does this model reflect real-world observations? Are its assumptions likely to hold and are they key to the model?” Negative answers to these questions do not necessarily imply the model should be scrapped. All models, after all, are simplifications. Any model that could handle every possible variation would be unwieldly and thus not provide much insight. Further, as Harold Demsetz warned us, just because the real world differs from some theoretical outcome it does not mean that alternatives are necessarily better, especially when one situation is viewed through the lens of reality and the other through the lens of theory.

In the previous post, I discussed some of the political realities surrounding economic justifications for trade restrictions, primarily using the optimal tariff model as an example. Are these objections enough to recommend against using policy to try to influence patterns of trade, or am I simply making the Nirvana Fallacy?

It is certainly true that markets can fail (broadly defined as failed to achieve some optimal level or distribution) and these failures can be corrected through judicious government actions. However, these actions can cause more harm than they actually solve. Indeed, for something like an optimal tariff, even if done with the best of intentions, it can backfire and result in a much worse scenario without much effort. Further, these justifications can be misused or hijacked to give intellectual cover for essentially selfish goals.

However, the biggest issue with trade policy is mistakes can become systematic and entrenched. Aside from the reasons discussed above, most political systems, and democracies/republics in particular, are designed to be slow-moving. This means if a policy is determined to be detrimental, it may take a while to repeal or alter even if we assume no self-interest lobbying or other barriers preventing the legislation from being changed.

National trade policy also necessarily must be general. As such, it is likely to be geared toward the average person or firm. The policy may be too restrictive for some and too broad for others; it may lead to a rather substantial misallocation in resources. Consider the following example: Imagine a room with 10 people inside, five of whom are six feet tall and five of whom are five feet tall. The average height of the room would be five feet, six inches. If there is a policy to build a door in the room so people may come and go, how would the policy be structured? Maybe it is structured so that the door must be at least six feet tall, thus everyone can easily use it, but that’d mean less wall space for windows and pictures and other things, and for half the people it’d be too tall a door. Likewise, they could order the door be at least five feet, six inches (the average height), but then the tall people would find the door inconvenient to use while the short people would have no problem. The necessity of general rules is part of the reason why government action should be limited to negative rules (eg, do not steal) rather than positive rules (eg eat five servings of veggies a day).

We also need to consider the knowledge problem. The actual level of knowledge necessary to accomplish these optimal policies is both dispersed and not even necessarily consciously known to the people holding the knowledge. Acquiring both the necessarily knowledge and acquiring it in a timely fashion are impossible. What’s more, what statistical information we can gleen has some major caveats attached. Economic data is collected primarily though the use of surveys to a sample of individuals and firms and then extrapolated to the aggregate level. However, as with any survey, these surveys are subject to the same caveats, assumptions, and error terms as anything else; they may not truly represent the real economic activity they are trying to measure. Further, as additional statistical techniques are run on them, the error terms must get larger and larger, not to mention the potential for error from sampling issues, violations of various assumptions, and the like.

With all these potential for errors, which are not limited to just the political realm, we are faced with the question “how to contain damage from failures?” As mentioned above, government rules quickly become systematic and entrenched. This means that an error in government policy could quickly affect the entire society. If, for example, government bets that the Next Big Thing is going to be autonomous cars and pours subsidies into their development, and then people decide they don’t want autonomous cars for whatever reason, the American taxpayers are held holding the bag. If the various government-supported firms go under, the taxpayers will not be reimbursed, nor have anything to show for the spending of funds that could have gone toward education, health care, infrastructure, or other uses. The error would be felt (to varying degrees) nationwide. Conversely, if a private firm makes the same bet and are subsequently proven wrong, the ones who feel the loss most acutely are the firm itself: the owners, the shareholders, and those who did business with them. The losses would be generally confined to those individuals and firms. Because of these potential losses, these private firms are more likely to be careful with their spending and their projects than would government-sponsored entities.

It is from the expectation of failure and not success that I argue for the presumption of liberty in policy. With managed trade policy, while there is the potential for upside, there is a rather substantial risk of a large downside, too. Should that downside occur (a very probable event in my opinion), it’s effects would be systemic and hard to remove. Conversely, if private individuals and firms make errors, they would be the primary recipient of the downsides. Thus, I argue that free markets are more robust to error than government is. This is not an argument from Nirvana, but rather from Hell.

A Discussion on Transaction Costs

This post is a riff on a recent op-ed column by Don Boudreaux at the Pitt Tribune “Minimum Wage & Technology.”

As Don writes:

When I explain to my students that minimum wages prompt firms to substitute technology for labor, they often react as if this greater reliance on technology is an upside of the job-destroying nature of minimum wages. But my students are mistaken.

This attitude is often portrayed as justification for all kinds of government interventions: minimum wage, labor restrictions, scarcityism, etc.  Technology is a sign of advancement, so we must advance!

But advancement is not a costless procedure.  Not only, as Don points out in his article, is there costs to developing said technology, but there are also costs to implementing and adopting such technology.  If a self-help kiosk is installed at a fast-food restaurant, its costs are more than just the new machine: it needs to be wired, staff trained (which reduces their productivity in the meantime), company policy created (and all other kinds of backroom stuff), etc.  All these things take time and resources; they all have costs.  If these costs, plus those that Don mentions in his article are higher than the benefits, then the intervention in the market, even if it produces newer technology, is a net loss.

This is an important point that is implied in the above discussion but I want to make explicit: just because there is a hypothetical “better” outcome, it does not mean that the market has failed!  If that outcome does not occur because the transaction and transition costs are too high, then the current outcome, with all its flaws, is the most optimal.

Indeed, there is really only one condition under which we can say with any certainty that a true market failure has occurred: if the outcome is suboptimal, and the transaction costs were misestimated, and this misestimation should have been known to the market participants.  This is an extremely high bar to reach, one that is made all the higher given it requires a huge judgment call on the part of the analyst.  In a sense, the analyst ends up begging the question since he has to assume his judgment and knowledge and subjective evaluations of the costs and benefits are equally shared by the participants (or he knows their inner workings).

Among economists of all stripes, the presumption of liberty, that is the promotion of free markets even when they are imperfect, remains predominant for exactly the reason discussed here: the knowledge of transaction and transition costs are highly personal and their existence gives the economist pause whenever discussing “welfare enhancing” policies specifically designed to control economies.

Today’s Quote of the Day…

…comes from pages 149-150 of Carl Dahlman’s 1979 Journal of Law & Economics article The Problem of Externality (emphasis added, footnote omitted):

In case I, the laundry owner correctly anticipates the costs of bargaining to be low enough for him to gain from reducing the smoke outpour from the steel mill: the externality becomes internalized by the steel operator. In case II, he correctly anticipates the cost of smoke reduction would be too high: he thus lives with the smoke. The externality is now internalized by the laundry operator, and there is no inoptimality problem. In case III, the laundry owner decides to bargain for reduction in smoke outpour but finds in the process of bargaining and policing the agreement that it cost him too much to do so. In case IV, he decides to live with the smoke in the belief that it would cost too much to reduce it but is incorrect: he would have gained from reducing it in view of the costs of transacting with the steel operator.

We have already noted that in cases I and II there is no Pareto-relevant externality remaining; the question remains whether there is one in cases III and IV. In case number III there is obviously no Pareto-relevant side effect remaining; on the contrary, there is too little smoke. The laundry owner lost by having the smoke reduced, so total income is lower in case III than it would have been if the smoke had been endured. In case IV, however, the laundry owner should have bargained for a reduction in smoke outpour but failed to do so. This is then the only case that can qualify as a potential externality.
From the point of view of the laundry owner, it would not appear that it is a mistake to endure the smoke: given the information that he has at his disposal, he performs his constrained optimization and does nothing. His information is incomplete or wrong, so he makes the wrong decision: given the correct information there is a loss of income from the enduring of the smoke, and the situation looks very much like  that we associate with an  externality. Yet that interpretation is fundamentally incorrect, for, with the information that the laundry owner has at his disposal when he makes the decision, he decides correctly, as constrained optimization procedures would have it. It is only later that he may realize that he has made a mistake, in view of additional information that was not available at the time. This can be regarded as an externality only if you assume that “he should have known better” or that there is someone else who does know better.

Once the logical implications of bargaining under transaction costs are fully accepted, it is seen that all existing side effects are internalized one way or the other. An assertion that externalities represent a deviation from an optimal allocation of resources then implies that the analyst considers himself in possession of superior information than what is available to market transactors: he knows the “true” probabilities, as it were. The issue of whether an alternative and improved allocation of resources exists is then seen to hinge on whether there is available relevant information about better alternatives.

People will act on the best information they have at the time.  That information may be incorrect; they may make mistakes, and mistakes that were obvious in retrospect.  But they are exactly that: retrospect.  Unless we assume the policymaker has superior knowledge of everyone’s costs and benefits (possible but not probable), we cannot say ex ante that some policy prescription is necessary or beneficial for solving externalities or other societal ills.  It’s quite probable, given people’s subjective costs and benefits, that all costs of an externality have already been internalized, that is to say, an optimal level has already been achieved.

Any political policy that alters how a market works, anything ostentatiously designed to correct a “market failure” runs into the same problem Dahlman discusses here: a knowledge problem.  The analyst or policymaker must either prove he has superior knowledge (itself a high hurdle to clear) or merely assume he does.  But it is only by retrospect can we determine if there actually is a market failure; it is damn near impossible to see one in real time.

Cooperation, Coordination, and the Law

Markets, by definition, rely on cooperation and coordination.  Buyers must cooperate with sellers in order to exchange; the seller must offer something the buyer wants and the buyer must offer something the seller wants.  Only through this cooperation can a trade occur.

Likewise, buyers and sellers must coordinate.  The buyer must be in the same place as the seller*.  A coordinating agent (ie a middleman) may sometimes be used to bring buyers and sellers together (think, for example, a realtor that brings home buyers to the home seller).  Similar to cooperation, buyers and sellers must coordinate on what to exchange and what their expectations are.

Cooperation and coordination are vital to the market process.

Economic texts tend to focus primarily on the coordinating and cooperation aspects of the market process, as they rightfully should, but a key factor is left out of the equation; that factor is the law.

Law here refers to the “rules of the game.”  Law is both written and unwritten; it is the set of rules, customs, norms, etc that develop through people’s interactions with one another.  Law, while shaped by peoples’ interactions, also shapes those interactions.

Law provides a useful form of coordination: who can sell what, what/how promises should be kept, what remedies exist for lawbreaking, that sort of thing.  Without law, and especially property rights, the coordination necessary for the market process would break down.

Consider, for example, property rights.  Property rights are a form of law; they may be formal (in the case of a deed registered at a local governmental authority) or it may be informal.  Property rights allow the market process to occur by defining who can trade what.  In other words, who owns the right to the use of a piece of property.  Ultimately what is being traded in any situation is a bundle of property rights.  If these are not clearly defined, then folks cannot know how to trade.  There cannot be coordination nor cooperation in this case.

Clearly-defined property rights are important to market transactions, but no property right will always and everywhere be perfectly clear.  We live in a world of “incomplete contracts.”  Not all possible situations can be anticipated and to write and understand property rights that take into account all possible conflicts is both physically impossible and economically wasteful (marginal cost exceeds marginal benefit).  In these ambiguities is where law also helps the market process.  Law, preferably by drawing on established rules of adjudication and precedent, can resolve these conflicts and allow the market process to function better (this was one of the great insights of Ronald Coase).

Law, of course, can have its own problems.  Just like any institution (including the market), it can be abused.  But it is vital to the coordination and cooperation functions of the market process.  Without law, trade cannot exist.  Only war.

*This place need not be physical