Immigration and Institutions: A Response to Jonny Anomaly

Writing at Quillette, Dr. Jonny Anomaly (yes, that’s his real name) discusses immigration, institutions, and why some immigration restrictions may be necessary.  It’s an interesting article, although I find his rationale for immigration restrictions rather weak.

Dr. Anomaly writes:

For one thing, the social norms and political institutions that promote prosperity are often quite fragile, as evidenced by recent events in Turkey, and the failure of constitutional democracy to take hold in Iraq after American attempts to replace dictatorship and tribalism with a secular liberal order.

I disagree with his interpretation of the evidence here.  The two examples he provides are where a liberal order was forced upon the area, rather than developed naturally.  Institutions, when imposed, do tend to be fragile.  This is seen in the work of many great developmental economists work (for example, see Doing Bad by Doing Good by Chris Coyne or The Tyranny of Experts by William Easterly).  However, where liberal institutions develop naturally, they tend to be highly robust.  The United States is an excellent example where despite many shocks to the system over the approximately 250 years of our existence, we remain a highly liberal country.  Shocks have included invasion, mass immigration (by both intelligent and less intelligent people), famine, drought, civil war, terrorism, etc.  The US is not ideally liberal, and there have been missteps, but the whole thing hasn’t collapsed the way it would have if institutions were inherently fragile.

He goes on to say:

Many supporters of open borders fail to distinguish between different qualities of immigrants. They assume that if a high level of immigration has benefitted some countries in particular eras, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia in the 19th and 20th centuries, then it is simply the quantity of migrants, rather than the composition of migrants, that caused prosperity in these nations. But this is a fallacious inference that depends on the assumption that all people are just as likely to promote the welfare of a country regardless of their values, skills, or traits.

In his recent book, Garrett Jones argues that a nation’s wealth and welfare depend crucially on the qualities of its citizens, including IQ, conscientiousness, and the ability to delay gratification. These personality traits are heritable, are (according to Jones) positively correlated with prosperity, and (according to criminologists) negatively correlated with crime.

The problem with this argument is that it doesn’t appear, at least prima facie, to be correct.  The mass immigration of the 19th and 20th Centuries was not of high-skilled immigrants.  Rather the opposite, really: they tended to be the dregs of European society.  And yet, America prospered.  Those who attempted to turn America toward Socialist institutions were not uneducated immigrants, but rather highly educated native WASPs.

This is not to discount the importance of intelligence in economic activity; quite the opposite.  But rather, an economy is made up of all kinds of goods: high quality, low quality and everything in between.  A dynamic economy allows all resources to find a niche, including labor.

There’s more I could say on this article, and maybe I will down the line, but I want to finish off with this: the evidence on immigration’s impact on the economy is far from crystal clear.  There are copious amounts of evidence pointing in both directions.  Given this ambiguity, I argue a liberal society demands that freedom is preserved and that the action which would restrict freedom (in this case, restricting freedom of commerce of the citizens of the society) must be shunned until evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is presented.


Taxation Is Not Necessarily Theft: A Rejoinder to Libertarians and Anarchists

Taxation, by its nature, is not necessarily theft.  Likewise, taking something and not giving something in return is not necessarily theft, either.  The circumstances are what matter.

By way of example: two men meet on the street.  One is selling apples.  The other man has money.  They agree to an exchange: one man gets $5, the other gets a bushel of apples.  The two go on their merry way, happy as can be.  No theft here.

A similar circumstance: two men meet on the street.  One is selling apples.  The other man has money.  While the apple seller is distracted, the other man takes an apple and leaves no money.  Now, a theft has occurred.

What is the difference between the two stories above?  In the first, there is consent between the two parties.  In the second, there is no consent.  Consent is what makes an action theft or voluntary.  There would be no argument whatsoever on this point.  So, the question becomes, can one never consent to taxation?  Is taxation inherently non-consensual?

The answer to that question is “no.”  Taxation is not inherently non-consensual.  It can be agreed upon; it can be consented to.  Let’s say a group of people get together and decide to pool their resources for some public good (let’s say, common defense).  Depending on the structure of their arrangement, they all agree to provide some annual contribution to this goal.  This is, in essence, taxation.  Furthermore, it is consensual taxation.

But if taxation can be consensual, doesn’t the use of (or threat of) force for compliance necessarily mean that taxation isn’t consensual?  Isn’t that evidence against my thesis?  Again, not necessarily.  Yes, the thief may use force to get what he wants, but even consensual agreements may carry a threat of force.  Contracts contain provisions in case one person reneges on his deal.  These are voluntary agreements that contain elements of force if certain conditions are not upheld.  So, the existence of force is not in and of itself a sign that the agreement is involuntary.

The real question, the one we should be discussing and thinking on, is “what constitutes consent?”  If governments “derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” what constitutes consent?  At what point does government “become destructive to these ends”?*  Yes, this is the interesting question and one I will not be discussing in this post.

*A quick aside on this point: using the same logic as above, it can be shown that merely being in a minority, losing an election, or not having things go your way in politics is not necessarily a sign of oppression or malfunctioning government.

An Open Letter to Classical Liberals

My Friends, Colleagues, and Allies:

We find ourselves at an interesting position here in 2017.  Individual liberty has made some positive strides recently (gay marriage, marijuana legalization, for example), but we’ve also suffered large defeats (Obamacare/Trumpcare, trade protectionism, for example).  It is a good time for reflection.

Classical liberalism has taken a backseat to the more illiberal political ideologies of modern conservatism, modern liberalism, socialism, and progressivism over the past century.  Many people argue that classical liberalism has no place in the modern world; it is an old philosophy that serves no purpose anymore.  These folks are right; we have given them no reason to consider us modern.

Classical liberals do not spend much time discussing the matters and issues of the day.  Most of the time, we simply deny they exist at all rather than engage.  Issues like global warming, the wage gap, gender inequality, income inequality, etc are simply dismissed as either hoaxes, mindless griping, or simply irrelevant.  I have done this myself.  But by failing to address these issues that are on people’s minds, regardless of the validity of such, we necessarily cede the conversation to the illiberal ideologies.  What’s worse, we look out of touch.

How can classical liberals remain relevant in today’s society?  By following in the footsteps of our forefathers and engaging in the issues of the day.  Let the sociologists argue about whether or not gender inequality exists (or multiple genders).  Let the economists argue about the wage gap.  Let the climate scientists argue about climate change.  Rather, let’s address these issues head on.  Taken the problem as given, how can classical liberalism address the issue?  How can classical liberalism address environmental issues?  How can classical liberalism address displacement from trade?  How can classical liberalism address the wage gap and discrimination?

If we are to remain relevant in today’s world, if we are to be given a seat at the table, we need to prove we belong there.  We need to engage people’s concerns, lest we doom ourselves to the perception of obsolescence.

Your Fellow in Liberty,

Jon Murphy
Fairfax, VA

Make Sure the Cure Isn’t Worse Than the Disease

TANSTAAFL.  Every action taken has costs, and sometimes those costs are borne by those who had no say in the matter (“negative externalities” to use the technical term).  The existence of externalities is often used to justify government involvement in markets (pollution tends to be the common example).  Lately, however, protectionists scarcityists have begun using that argument to promote their policies, noting job loss as an externality.  Some, more generally, claim “practical people not tied to free trade dogma understand that trade sometimes is good and that it’s bad other times.”

It certainly is possible that, any given transaction, may have enough unforeseen negative consequences as to have negative net benefits.  However, the bar needed to justify government action is high:

From a purely economic perspective*, protectionists have two tasks before them:

1) Prove that imports cause greater net harm than domestic production


2) Prove the proposed solution minimizes the net loss (or, inversely, maximizes net benefits). This is where comparative institutional analysis comes in.

The mere existence of condition (1) is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify government intervention. If the cost of government intervention exceeds the benefits therefrom, then even though the free market option has a net loss, it is the optimal solution because the resulting intervention would make matters worse!

The existence of condition (1) may require collective action to solve, but it may be more cheaply solved via non-government collective decision making (ie, a firm).**

There may be cases where government decision making is the lowest cost option.  However, it is very much a case-by-case basis.  Blanket legislation (like a tariff) does not allow for the necessary flexibility to make such decisions.  In order to minimize costs (and thus maximize net benefit), freedom must be given first preference, with the burden of proof upon protectionists.

*There could be many other arguments for protectionism, such as legal, or national defense.  I shan’t get bogged down in a discussion here.  I’ll leave that to the experts.

**For a more in-depth discussion on this point, read The Calculus of Consent by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, in particular Chapter 5.

Today’s Quote of the Day…

…is from page 147 of the excellent new book Arguments for Liberty (edited by Aaron Ross Powell and Grant Babcock).  This quote comes from the essay on Contractarianism by Jan Narveson (original emphasis):

Liberalism is exemplified by normative systems that hold two points: (a) that the sole acceptable purpose of rules, laws, and in general interventions must be the good of those intervened upon; and (b) that it is those persons themselves, rather than any supposed authorities, who fundamentally embrace those values.  Individuals, then, are the basic holders of the values that interventionist institutions and personages are to respect….Both are essential.  So-called liberals of the present day tend to think that they, the pundits or theorists or the elected politicians, know what people want better than the people themselves.