On the Nature of Freedom

Occasionally, one will here in the argument against open borders: “How many immigrants will you let into your house?” or “Why don’t you have any immigrants living in your house?” or some variation thereof. These retorts miss the point of freedom.

Freedom means the right to do something. The flip side of that is the right to not do it. Freedom of movement, for example, means I have the right to move from Virginia to North Carolina. It likewise means I have the right to not do so. Freedom to purchase tobacco necessarily means the freedom to not purchase tobacco. To call for the freedom of migration between countries does not imply any form of contract to house or employ immigrants. What it does do is call for the freedom to contract with those individuals for all people. I may not want to hire person X for a job, but that does not mean no one should hire person X.

In a free market, everyone is allowed to buy what they with with whomever is willing to sell it to them (barring violations of the rules of justice, of course). Likewise, a person is free to not buy anything.

Advocates who use the above argument (other variations include “people who support gun rights should be shot first” or “people who want abortions should be forced to listen to the heartbeat”) fail to understand the dual nature of freedom.

On Justice

My friend and colleague at GMU, Nathan Goodman, writes the following on Facebook (link added):

“To remain neutral in situations of injustice is to be complicit in that injustice.”-Desmond Tutu

Nine years ago today I thought this was correct. Today, I am not so sure. After all, people have limited knowledge and may in many cases be unable to choose an action that is effective at combatting injustice. The unintended consequences of their actions may generate new injustices. Neutrality may therefore often be the best available option in a complex world. See also Michael Huemer’s paper “In Praise of Passivity.”

That said, I don’t reject Tutu’s statement here entirely. It is a useful rhetorical device to induce participation in social movements. This is important, given that the end of an injustice is non-excludable and therefore there is an incentive to free ride on the activism of others. Moreover, in some cases, Tutu’s comments may be not just useful but true. There may be no option for neutral action. For instance, if the perpetrator of an injustice is a state you live under, then you are financing the injustice by paying your taxes. Absent other choices taken to combat the injustice, your impact on the injustice is not neutral.

I wish to expand on Nathan’s first point regarding the knowledge problem and justice.

Archbishop Tutu’s quote is Ciceroian in its origins. In De Officiis, Marcus Tullius Cicero writes:

But there are also two kinds of injustice: first, the injustice of those who inflict injury; second, those who, although able, do not repel injury from those upon whom it is being inflicted. For he who unjustly attacks another, whether he is incited either by anger or by some other perturbation, that person, as it were, seems to raise his hand against an ally. And he who, although able, neither defends against nor opposes the injury done to another, that person is as vicious as if he had abandoned his parents, friends, or country.

De Officiis 1.23, pg 31 (Newton Translation)

However, to Nathan’s point above, Cicero goes on to say:

[B]ecause we perceive and feel those things that turn out either well or adverse for ourselves more than those for others, we see the latter as if from a far distance, and judge them differently from our own. Consequently, such people advise well who forbid any action in which you may doubt whether it is equitable or inequitable. For equity is conspicuous in itself; doubt signifies the contemplation of injury.

1.30, pg 33

The intervention upon an injustice may, given our self-knowledge, be misguided. The prescription to intervene in the name of justice laid out by Cicero (and perhaps, consequently, by Tutu) is more nuanced and guided by our limited knowledge. Indeed, Cicero seems to urge caution in matters of justice.

Cicero distinguishes between two kinds of justice. While Cicero doesn’t name these two kinds of justice, preferring to simply call them “one kind” or “the other,” they are very similar to the kinds of justice Adam Smith lays out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: communitive justice (simply put, not messing with other people’s stuff) and distributive justice (simply put, making a becoming use of your resources) (see TMS, in particular pages 269-270.10). We cause injustice, according to the Cicero quote above, when we cause harm to another person (violation of communitive justice) or we fail to prevent an injustice from occurring if it is within our power. Cicero seems to treat the rules of this first kind of justice as “precise and accurate” like Smith does and the rules of this second kind as “loose, vague, and indeterminate”, again like Smith. To commit a violation of the first kind of justice is pretty straightforward: inflict injury (or cause “real harm” to use Smith’s phrasing). Violations of the second kind of justice are more vague and depend on one’s knowledge, one’s abilities, one’s personal circumstances, and the good of the community as a whole (see 1.27-33, pgs. 32-35). The Tutu quote that Nathan provides gives the impression that the second form of justice has precision in its rules, which is not necessarily the case (it’s possible, indeed even probable, that Tutu realized this subtlety and, in a greater context, acknowledges and discusses it).

Knowledge, temperance, and propriety do need to play a role in our actions. As with any virtue, it is possible to take it too far and become a vice. Justice burns hotly within the soul of every person; injustice inflames passions and makes us feel that extreme passion known as resentment. Resentment can be strong (how many people call for the head of a murderer?). And it’s all the more reason to intervene in the name of justice carefully. Our own perceptions and world views color our view and what may seem like an injustice may actually be not. Intervention in these grey cases may actually be the injustice.

Necessary but not Sufficient

In my latest article for Libertarianism.org, I argue that the existence of a “market failure” is a necessary but not sufficient condition for government intervention in the economy.  A slice:

As with all economic questions, the answer is “compared to what?” Externalities, compared on an idealized hypothetical world where all information is known and transactions are costless, appear easy to solve via government regulation. However, when we compare a world of externalities to the real world, where costs and benefits are subjective and ultimately judgement calls must be made by analysts, we see that externalities are necessary but not sufficient justification for government intervention.

 

Big Changes Coming

Dear readers-

I have an announcement to make (please scroll down to see my latest blog post).

For the past three years, WordPress has hosted A Force for Good.  However, due to a number of circumstances (not the least of which is WordPress increasing their prices and reducing their ease of use), I will be moving this blog to my personal website: www.jonmmurphy.com.  The blog may be found here.

For the time being, posts will be made both here and at my other website.  When the integration is fully made, I will make another post.  Until then, you may continue to read here.

Commenting at the new blog will be handled through Disqus.  You will need an account, like with WordPress, but that’s it.  I am working on keeping all other functions the same.  I ask for your patience during this time.

Thank you,

Jon

The Metric Fallacy

We often hear some proclamation, usually in support of subsidizing some activity, that some activity is desirable because it leads to success (for example: “Education is an investment in the future”).  But this is what I will henceforth call the “Metric Fallacy,” which is a specific form of the “ad hoc ergo propter hoc” fallacy.

The fallacy goes like this:

Some desirable outcome, X, is highly correlated with broad category Y.

Therefore, to achieve X, one should increase Y.

The first statement is true (X and Y are correlated).  The second statement, however, is fallacious.  A practical example will help:

It is true that higher education is correlated with higher levels of income.  According to the College Board, a person with even just some college education earns approximately 13% more than someone with just a high school degree.  Higher levels of education are correlated with higher levels of income.

But it is fallacious to, therefore, say that education itself is the cause here.  We need far more information.  The type of education matters a whole lot more.  A person in theology earns considerably less than a person in chemical engineering.  Ceteris paribus, a doctoral degree in a STEM field will earn a lot more than a doctoral degree in religion.

Thus, the Metric Fallacy is: to increase income, we need to increase education.

We see the Metric Fallacy all over the place and in high-ranking areas (Education and Economic Growth Theory and subsequently foreign investment, just to name a few).  Many government policies are based off this fallacy, including minimum wage, subsidized college loans, foreign aid plans that involve capital donations, and the like.  Indeed, probably the greatest lie I heard as a child was “if you want a good job, you have to go to college.”

My colleague and professor Chris Coyne writes a lot about this in his excellent book “Doing Bad by Doing Good,” and it is the main thesis of Bill Easterly’s book “The Tyranny of Experts.”

The other day, I wrote about discovering prices vs imposing prices.  Discovering prices means that we see what prices emerge from the price system, people acting in response to relative scarcity.  When prices emerge, they provide information.  A person in a profession who earns a high salary means there is a relative scarcity of that profession.  He is indeed made better off by this, but it also signals that we need more of that profession.  Prices allow us to discover this information.  But it is a fallacy to conclude that his higher wage is in some way desirable for anything other than this purpose (eg, the protectionist who might argue if he is made “worse” off because of competition, we all are made worse off).

Today’s Quote of the Day…

…is from page 99 of Roger Koppl’s 2018 book Expert Failure (original emphasis)

Many thinkers (and most undergraduate economics students) seem to believe that any “laws of economics” would have to be first devised and promulgated and then followed.  If there is a law, there is a lawgiver.  But the “laws” of a spontaneous order generally function even when nobody is aware of them.  Thus, an increase in the supply of a commodity causes its price to fall in Homeric Greece no less surely than in nineteenth-century London.

JMM: We can broaden Dr Koppl’s statement to more than just economic laws.  Laws, as distinguished from legislation, are followed without necessarily any conscious knowledge of the law.  Some laws are universal (such as the increase of supply noted here), and some may be specific to a time and place (such as the orderly fashion a crowd leaves a stadium after a ballgame), but prior direction of the laws are not necessary to their functioning.  Indeed, we tend to pick up on the laws not necessarily through formal education, but rather through social cues from our interactions.

The fact that laws are not necessarily known beforehand and explicitly leads to the reason why they need to be discovered (see my post here).  Laws are something observed though human action.

 

Today’s Quote of the Day…

…comes from page 80 of Roger Koppl’s excellent 2018 book Expert Failure (link added, original emphasis):

Earlier we saw Lee Ellis argue for chemical castration of young men with “crime-prone genes.” Writers who, like Ellis (2008), view experts as reliable and nonexperts as powerless do not usually subject their theories to the reflexivity requirement.  Ellis’ essay illistrates, however, the importance of the reflexivity that all agents of the system be modeled.  He models persons with “crime-prone genes,” but not the experts who would administer sterilization policies.  He consequently wishes to place discretionary power in the hands of persons unlikely to exercise such power with the Solomonic disinterest and wisdom his policies would require even under the assumption that his eugenic ideas are correct.  In the theory of experts, as in all of social science, all agents must be modeled if we are to minimize the risk of proposing policies that would require some actors to behave in ways that are inconsistent with their incentives or beyond human capabilities.

JMM:  Economics, and the social sciences in general, try to emulate the natural sciences by means and methods.  But the social sciences differ from the natural sciences in the key way that Koppl mentions here: we are part of the very thing we are modeling.  To borrow a metaphor from elsewhere in Koppl, we are also the ants in the anthill.  So is government.

The big assumption made by many people, both on the left and on the right, is that government is somehow made out of finer clay than the rest of us mere mortals.  This may be because they were elected, or appointed by God, or appointed by some panel of experts, or whatever.  That, for some reason never really explained, those imposing rules and regulations upon us are free of the “crime-prone genes” or self-interest or moral failings of the rest of us.  Were this true, were men really ruled by angels, then we would be near Heaven.  But alas, human history indicates that this is not so.  We all make mistakes, even under the best of intentions.  The question is how to limit the danger of those mistakes.