Writing at Human Progress, Martin Tupy has an excellent article on the real effects of predatory pricing and monopoly. Here is the upshot (although one should read the whole article. It is excellent):
In a 2014 Council on Foreign Relations report, Eugene Gholz, an associate professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, revisited the crisis and found that the Chinese embargo [of rare earths to Japan] proved to be a bit of a dud. Some Chinese exporters got around the embargo by using legal loopholes, such as selling rare earths after combining them with other alloys. Others smuggled the elements out of China outright. Some companies found ways to make their products using smaller amounts of the elements while others “remembered that they did not need the high performance of specialized rare earth[s] … they were merely using them because, at least until the 2010 episode, they were relatively inexpensive and convenient.” Third, companies around the world started raising money for new mining projects, ramped up the existing plant capacities and accelerated plans to recycle rare earths.
In other words, when faced with a sudden shortage, people compensated through other means. It’s almost as if demand curves slope downward.
Monopolies are still subject to the whims of consumers. They cannot raise their prices with impunity. As prices remain high, people will innovate around them. This indicates that the fear of predatory pricing, that a firm (or country) will seize market power and use it to jack up prices or manipulate people, are greatly overblown.